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FIRST DAY SECTION TWO 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Norfolk, Virginia - February 24, 2004 
Write your answers to Questions 6 and 7 in Answer Booklet D - (the .e.LUE 
booklet) 
6. On March 1, 2002, Paul purchased a new sports utility vehicle ("SUV") from 
Lexiconda Motors of Lexington, Virginia. The SUV was manufactured by Allied Industries. No 
express warranty was provided to Pau1. 
Beginning on April 1, 2002, Paul began experiencing problems including a loose 
gearshift lever, heater malfunctions, fast idling, excessive oil conswnption, and overheating. 
These were all problems that he could not have reasonably discovered before he bought the SUV 
and which he reasonably expected the dealership could remedy. From the time of purchase until 
July 31, 2002, Paul had returned the SUV to the dealership at least five times. The dealership 
responded to all the complaints with efforts to repair the vehicle. Some problems were cured, 
while others recurred after temporary repairs. The overall effect was that defects and 
malfunctions persisted, he was deprived of the use of the SUV for significant periods of time, 
and he incurred rental expenses for a vehicle while the SUV was at the dealership undergoing 
repairs. 
On August 1, 2002, after having driven the SUV 5,000 miles, Paul wrote to Lexiconda 
Motors demanding that Lexiconda Motors pick up the SUV and give him a full refund of the 
purchase price, along with interest and expenses incurred while the vehicle had been in the shop 
or, in the alternative, a replacement with a new, comparable SUV. Lexiconda Motors decided 
not to respond, waiting instead for Paul actually to tender his SUV back to the dealership. 
While waiting for a response, Paul continued to drive the vehicle because he lacked any 
other means of transportation. Within a week after he began hearing a front-end noise in late 
August, Paul bought another vehicle and left the SUV parked in his driveway, intending not to 
use it until Lexiconda Motors came to pick it up. As of that time, he had driven the SUV an 
additional 2,000 miles. 
Lexiconda Motors has not responded to Paul. He now wishes to file suit against 
Lexiconda Motors to revoke his acceptance of the sales contract and to obtain a refund of the 
pm:chase price. He also wishes to sue both Lexiconda Motors and Allied Industries for damages 
he incurred as a result of the defects in the SUV and punitive damages. In your answer to 
the four subparts below, do NOT discuss the Virginia Motor Vehicle 
Warranty Enforcement Act ("Lemon Law"). 
(a) Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), is Paul entitled to seek the 
alternative relief ofrevocation of the sales contract and compensatory damages in 
the same lawsuit? Explain fully. 
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(b) Under the UCC, as against Lexiconda Motors, is Paul entitled to revocation of the 
sales contract and a return of the purchase price? Explain fully. 
(c) Under the UCC, as against Lexiconda Motors and Allied Industries, is Paul 
entitled to recover damages incurred as a result of the defects in the SUV and, if 
so, what is the measure of those damages? Explain fully. 
(d) As against Lexiconda Motors and Allied Industries, is Paul entitled to recover 
punitive damages? Explain fully. 
Reminder: Write your answer to the ABOVE · question 
#6 in Booklet D - the BWE Booklet. 
* * * * * 
7. Abby was a graduate student at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, 
Virginia. She planned to live in Charlottesville for the next two years while she completed her 
studies and then to return to Tennessee, which was her home and where she maintained her 
mailing address and voter registration. 
Coffee Haven, a cafe on the university campus, is one of a chain of cafes owned and 
operated by Coffee Havens, Inc. (CHI), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Tennessee. 
On August 15, 2002, while Abby was having a cup of coffee at an outdoor table at Coffee 
Haven, the cafe's heavy overhead sign fell and struck Abby. She suffered severe head trauma, 
was hospitalized, and had to drop out of school for the semester. 
On October 15, 2002, Abby filed a motion for judgment against CHI in the Circuit Court 
in Charlottesville alleging negligence and seeking damages in excess of $100,000. Before her 
attorney could effect service of process on CHI, a local newspaper published an article about the 
incident and mentioned Abby's lawsuit. 
On October 30, 2002, CHI's law department in Tennessee, having received the 
newspaper article, obtained a copy of the motion for judgment from the Circuit Court clerk's 
office in Charlottesville. On November 15, 2002, CHI was properly served with the notice of 
motion for judgment at its home office in Tennessee. 
On December 15, 2002, CHI took the following steps to remove the case to the federal 
district court in Charlottesville: It filed a Notice of Removal in the federal district court, 
attaching a copy of the notice of motion for judgment and a short statement that removal was 
based on diversity grounds; it served the Notice of Removal and the attachments on Abby. CHI 
did nothing further to effect removal. 
On January 14, 2003, Abby filed in the federal district court a motion to remand the case 
to state court on the grounds that (i) CHI's removal was procedurally flawed and (ii), in any 
event, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied Abby's motion on both 
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grounds. 
On September 1, 2003, after a trial on the merits, the federal district court entered a 
judgment against CHI for $100,000. On September 10, 2003, CHI properly filed a motion for a 
new trial. On October 10, the court properly denied the motion and entered its order of denial. 
On October 20, 2003, CHI filed a Notice of Appeal with the federal district court clerk 
and paid all necessary fees. The clerk served the notice upon Abby. Abby filed a motion in the 
federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had not 
been timely filed. 
(a) Were the federal district court's rulings on each of the grounds of Abby's motion 
to remand correct? Explain fully. 
(b) How should the Court of Appeals rule on Abby's motion to dismiss the appeal? 
Explain fully. 
Reminder: Write your answer to the ABOVE question 
#7 in Booklet D - the BWE Booklet. 
* * * * * 
~~ Now SWITCH to the PURPLE Answer Booklet - Booklet E ~~ 
Write your answer to Questions 8 and 9 in Answer Booklet E - (the 
PURPLE booklet). 
8. Dolly Lama lives in a residential subdivision in Fairfax County, Virginia. 
Abutting the rear of Dolly's lot is a wooded ten-acre undeveloped and unoccupied parcel owned 
by Ronny Church. River Bend Run, a fast-running, but non-navigable, creek in Fairfa'C County, 
runs along the far edge of Ronny's parcel. To get from Dolly's lot to the creek, one must walk 
across Ronny's parcel for about 150 yards. 
Two years ago Dolly discovered that the creek is well-populated with bass and trout, and, 
since then she frequently crosses Ronny's property to fish in the creek. 
Dolly is active in promoting activities for disabled children. She frequently invites 
groups of disabled youngsters to come to her home and to hike back through Ronny's beautiful 
woods to the creek, where they enjoy a few very wholesome and therapeutic hours. Dolly has 
received national acclaim for this, including a citation from the Virginia General Assembly 
commending Dolly's program and her important work in the public interest. 
Ronny, who lives in an apartment in the City of Alexandria, Virginia, noticed that a small 
path has been worn from the rear of Dolly's lot across his ten acres to the creek. One weekend, 
he found Dolly fishing in the creek, confronted her about crossing his property without 
permission, and told her to stay off of his property. Dolly tried to explain to Ronny about the 
enjoyment that the disabled children derived from playing around and in the creek, but Ronny 
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was adamant that no one should go on his property. Dolly was equally adamant that she and her 
friends, the disabled children, would continue to cross the property on weekends to get to the 
creek, which Dolly says is a "public treasure." Despite Ronny's demand that Dolly identify the 
children by name, she refused to do so and she instructed the children not to speak to this "mean 
man." 
Ronny filed a Bill of Complaint against Dolly and "unnamed children" in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Alexandria. In the suit Ronny seeks to recover damages against Dolly for 
crossing his land without permission and prays for immediate and permanent injunctive relief 
against Dolly and the unnamed children to prevent further incursions on his land. 
Dolly filed a demurrer seeking dismissal of Ronny's suit on the grounds that (i) it is filed 
in the wrong court; (ii) it cannot proceed against unnamed persons; and (iii) it improperly joins 
legal and equitable claims. 
The Court denied Dolly's demurrer on all grounds and entered a decree, transferring the 
case to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. 
Dolly then filed an answer in which she asserted the following defenses: (i) Ronny has 
suffered no appreciable damages; (ii) Ronny has an adequate remedy at law; and (iii) the 
interests in this case should be balanced in her favor. 
(a) Was the disposition of the Alexandria court on Dolly's demurrer correct on each 
ground? Explain fully. 
(b) Can Ronny present a prima facie case on each of the elements of each of his 
claims? Explain fully. 
(c) How should the court rule on each of Dolly's defenses? Explain fully. 
Reminder: Write _your answ~r to the ·ABOVE questi9n 
• • ••• .+ • ·-· 
=#8 in Booklet E - the PlJRPLE · Booklet. 
* * * * * 
9. Beginning at about 10:00 a.m. February 17, 2000, and continuing heavily 
throughout the day, a major winter storm arrived in the City of Norfolk, Virginia. The snow 
accumulated more rapidly on the ground, streets and bridges than it could be removed. 
At about noon on February 17, Percy went to S & T Market, his local grocery store, to 
obtain food and other supplies. Although a store employee swept the snow off its walkways 
periodically, it kept accumulating rapidly. Percy slipped on the snow that had accumulated on 
the sidewalk in front of the store since the last sweeping and broke his ankle. As a result, Percy 
could not walk, so he was transported to the hospital by the City ofNorfolk's paramedic rescue 
service. 
En route to the hospital, the ambulance in which Percy was being transported was 
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broadsided at an intersection by a car driven by Dallas. Dallas failed to stop because the traffic 
light at the intersection malfunctioned. Percy suffered a concussion and multiple contusions as a 
result of this collision. 
While waiting in the hospital emergency room with Percy, the City's paramedic filled out 
a standard City accident report for his supervisor. Percy told the paramedic, "The only thing I 
want you to be sure to put in your report is that this whole situation would not have happened if I 
hadn't had to wait so long in line at City Hall to pay my gosh darned car tax. That's the only 
reason I didn't get to S & T before it started snowing." 
Upon his release from the hospital on February 19, Percy visited his attorney, Lawyer, 
and told her he wanted to sue the City and S & T. At a civic club meeting on February 28, 
Lawyer saw the City's Fire and Paramedic Chief, told him about what had happened to Percy, 
and mentioned that Percy intended to sue the City. When he returned to his office later that day, 
the Fire Chief called the City Attorney, advised him of the conversation with Lawyer, and sent 
the City Attorney a copy of the accident report submitted earlier by his paramedic. 
On December 1, 2000, Lawyer sent a letter to the City Attorney advising him of Percy's 
injury, the date of the injury, the location of the injury, and of Percy's allegation that the City 
was liable for the injuries he suffered in the collision. In January 2001, Lawyer filed an action 
for Percy against the City and the S & T Market. The motion for judgment alleged that the City 
was liable for Percy's injuries resulting from the collision because it had negligently maintained 
the traffic light. As against S & T, it alleged that S & Twas liable for Percy's broken ankle 
because of S & T's negligence in keeping its walkways clear of snow as the storm began. 
(a) What defenses, if any, does the City have to Percy's claim? Explain fully. 
(b) What defenses, if any, does S & T Market have to Percy's claim? Explain fully. 
Reminder: Write your answer _ to the ABOVE question 
#9 in Booklet E - the 'PLIRP' E Booklet. 
* * * * * 
Proceed to the short answer questions in Booklet F - (the 
GRAY Booklet). 
